Least worst regret analysis for decision making under uncertainty, with
  applications to future energy scenarios by Zachary, Stan
Least worst regret analysis for decision making under
uncertainty,
with applications to future energy scenarios
Stan Zachary∗
Heriot-Watt University
August 3, 2016
Abstract
Least worst regret (and sometimes minimax) analysis are often used for
decision making whenever it is difficult, or inappropriate, to attach probabilities
to possible future scenarios. We show that, for each of these two approaches and
subject only to the convexity of the cost functions involved, it is always the case
that there exist two “extreme” scenarios whose costs determine the outcome of
the analysis in the sense we make clear. The results of either analysis are
therefore particularly sensitive to the cost functions associated with these two
scenarios, while being largely unaffected by those associated with the remainder.
Great care is therefore required in applications to identify these scenarios and
to consider their reasonableness.
We also consider the relationship between the outcome of a least worst regret
and a Bayesian analysis, particularly in the case where the regret functions
associated with the scenarios largely differ from each other by shifts in their
arguments, as is the case in many applications.
We study in detail the problem of determining an appropriate level of elec-
tricity capacity procurement in Great Britain, where decisions must be made
several years in advance, in spite of considerable uncertainty as to which of a
number of future scenarios may occur, and where least worst regret analysis is
currently used as the basis of decision making.
1 Introduction
Many economic decisions, for example that of an appropriate level of investment,
need to be taken in the face of uncertainties about future conditions. Were these
conditions known an optimal decision might be made, usually on the basis of the
minimisation of a cost function. Indeed were it possible to assign probabilities to fu-
ture conditions—frequently condensed into a finite number of scenarios—one might
reasonably minimise an expected cost, or perhaps some other appropriate functional
of the probability distribution of cost (see, for example, Berger [1]). However, even
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this is frequently not possible, either because of insufficient data or other infor-
mation with which to make an appropriate assessment of probabilities, or because
future conditions are dependent upon other human decisions—for example political
decisions—yet to be made, and it would be inappropriate to attempt to second-guess
these.
A Bayesian decision maker would simply assign subjective probabilities to future sce-
narios, using such information as was available, and then proceed as above. However,
there is often an understandable reluctance to do this, and then recourse is made
to one of various economic decision making criteria which do not require the assign-
ment of probabilities, and which are therefore often described as “robust”. Whether
this really makes sense is a matter of philosophical debate: if one believes that the
probabilities matter—at least, for example, that highly likely future scenarios should
have more weight in the decision making process than highly unlikely ones—then
the use of techniques which entirely ignore probabilities might simply be regarded
as suboptimal. However, the continued use of such techniques is often justified on
pragmatic grounds.
In the present paper, we study two commonly used non-probabilistic techniques. In
both cases associated with each future scenario to be considered is a cost function
defined on the set of possible decisions. In minimax analysis that decision is made
which minimises the maximum cost to be incurred over all possible scenarios. This
technique, based on extreme risk aversion, has a long history; for an early systematic
treatment, see Savage [2]. In least worst regret (or minimax regret) analysis, the
cost function associated with each scenario is modified by subtracting its minimum
value over the decision set; the resulting functions are termed the regret functions
associated with the scenarios, and the minimax criterion is applied to the set of regret
functions rather than the original cost functions. This technique was first introduced
in the early 1980s, independently in the papers by Loomes and Sugden [3] and by
Bell [4] and in the book by Fishburn [5], and has been the subject of some subsequent
study, usually in the context of specific and often complex models.
More formal definitions of both these techniques are given in the next section. Least
worst regret analysis in particular is much used in practice. However, depending on
the nature of the cost functions involved, neither technique can be said to be always
scientifically rational. Minimax analysis suffers from the problem that a single
scenario with an associated cost function which is uniformly high across the decision
set (notably one which is pointwise higher than the cost functions associated with
all other scenarios) may alone determine the outcome of the analysis, even though
this scenario may be unlikely and/or may have a relatively flat cost function—note
that either of the latter circumstances strongly suggests that such a scenario should
not be influential in cost-based decision making. Least worst regret analysis avoids
this particular problem by effectively adjusting the cost function associated with
each scenario so that its minimum value across the decision set is zero (thus defining
the regret function). There are some well-rehearsed arguments as to why this is
to be preferred—see, for example, the references cited above, and note also that a
Bayesian probabilistic analysis also depends on the cost functions only through their
associated regret functions, as noted more formally in the next section. However
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least worst regret analysis has the unfortunate property that, depending on the cost
functions involved, which of two decisions is to be preferred may depend on the costs
associated with a third possible decision—-or indeed on whether that third possible
decision is actually included in the decision set—a point to which we return in more
detail in Section 2. Neither minimax analysis nor a Bayesian probabilistic analysis
suffers from this problem.
Thus we would argue that the uncritical adoption of either of the above techniques is
to be avoided. Whether either of them works well in practice depends very much on
the shape of the cost functions involved, as well as on the specification of the decision
set itself. This is one issue we wish to explore in the present paper. Our particular
interest is in least worst regret analysis, as the latter seems to be presently widely
used. One such use is that of the determination, in Great Britain, of an optimal
level of provision of “conventional” electricity generation capacity; this is something
which must be decided several years in advance, even although there are considerable
uncertainties as to both future electricity demand and the future availability of “non-
conventional”, i.e. renewable, generation. We study this example in Section 4.
In Section 2 we give more formal definitions and study some relevant mathematical
properties of both minimax and least worst regret analysis. Our main result is that
in either case, given the convexity of the cost functions, it is possible to identify two
“extreme” scenarios which essentially determine the outcome of the analysis in a
sense we make precise there—roughly speaking the other scenarios do not matter at
all provided none of them becomes more extreme than the two above. It follows that
great care needs to be taken in the specification of the most “extreme” scenarios
to be considered. We also study the common situation in which, at least to a first
approximation, the differences between the scenario regret functions are represented
by shifts in their arguments; here the “extreme” scenarios are immediately iden-
tifiable and the properties of a least worst regret analysis—particularly robustness
with respect to scenario variation—readily understood. Finally in that section, we
consider briefly the alternative Bayesian analysis and how the outcome of a least
worst regret analysis might relate to it.
Section 3 studies the problem in which each of the scenario cost functions is—
again at least approximately—the sum of an exponentially decaying and a linearly
increasing term. Here it is possible to make quite quantitative deductions about the
outcome of a least worst regret analysis and its relation to that of possible Bayesian
analyses. This situation is common when the decision problem is that of choosing an
appropriate level of investment—in the face of future uncertainty—so as to manage
risk. It is in particular the case (again to a good approximation) for the Great
Britain electricity capacity procurement problem which was introduced above and
which is studied in detail in the following section.
In the concluding Section 5 we make some further brief comments about the sensible
application of least worst regret analysis.
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2 Minimax and least worst regret analysis
Both minimax and least worst regret (LWR) analysis are defined in relation to a
set S of scenarios—which in the present note we take to be finite—and a set D of
possible decisions. The decision set D may be finite or infinite. Corresponding to
each scenario i ∈ S is a cost function fi defined on the set D such that for each x ∈ D
the quantity fi(x) is the cost associated with the decision x under the scenario i.
The decision problem is that of choosing x ∈ D such that the associated costs fi(x)
are in some sense minimised. This problem as stated is not yet well-defined, and
our interest is the mathematical properties and relationships between the various
rival approaches to making it well-defined, in particular with the minimax, least
worst regret and Bayesian approaches (where the latter additionally requires an
assignment of probabilities to scenarios).
We shall find it convenient to think also of the decision problem associated with
any subset S ′ of the set of scenarios S. For any such subset S ′, define further the
maximum cost function fS′ by
fS′(x) = max
i∈S′
fi(x). (1)
Then the minimax solution x∗S′ to the decision problem associated with the set S ′
is the value of x within the decision set D which minimises fS′(x). In particular x∗S
is the minimax solution associated with the entire set of scenarios S.
We shall find it convenient to write also x∗i = x
∗
{i} for each i ∈ S and similarly to
write x∗kl = x
∗
{k,l} for each subset {k, l} of S of size two. For each i ∈ S, define also
the regret function fˆi by
fˆi(x) = fi(x)− fi(x∗i ) (2)
(where, as defined above, x∗i is the value of x which minimises fi(x) in the decision
set D). Analogously to the definition of (1), for any subset S ′ of S, define also the
worst regret function fS′ associated with the set of scenarios S ′ by
fˆS′(x) = max
i∈S′
fˆi(x). (3)
Then the least worst regret (LWR) (or minimax regret) solution xˆS′ to the decision
problem associated with the set S ′ is the value of x which minimises fˆS′(x). That is,
the LWR solution xˆS′ associated with the set S ′ is the minimax solution associated
with that set in the case where the original cost functions fi, i ∈ S, are replaced by
the regret functions fˆi, i ∈ S. In particular xˆS is the LWR solution associated with
the entire set of scenarios S.
Note that while xˆi = x
∗
i for each i ∈ S, for any subset S ′ of S of size at least two the
quantities x∗S′ and xˆS′ are in general different. Further, if any of the functions fi,
i ∈ S ′, is adjusted by the addition (or subtraction) of a constant, then the mini-
max solution x∗S′ will in general change while (since the regret function fˆi will be
unaffected) the LWR solution xˆS′ will remain unchanged.
However, note also that LWR analysis has the following dubious property, which
is essentially a restatement of that referred to in the Introduction. Suppose that
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the decision set D is restricted to some subset D′, and suppose further that in
consequence there is at least one scenario i ∈ S such that the minimising value x∗i of
the cost function fi within the set D fails to belong to the set D′. Then the regret
function fˆi defined in relation to the set D′ differs from that defined in relation to
the set D. Thus, for any set S ′ of scenarios, the restriction of the decision set D to D′
in general changes the solution xˆS′ of the LWR analysis—even although the original
solution (as well as the new solution) may itself belong to both D′ and D. We
therefore have the situation where which of two possible decisions is to be preferred
depends—somewhat illogically—on what is happening elsewhere in the decision set.
We are interested in some further properties of both minimax and LWR analysis of
the decision problems defined by the possible scenario sets S ′, and in particular by
the “maximum” set of scenarios S. Since as, explained above, for any such S ′ the
LWR solution xˆS′ is the minimax solution applied to the regret functions fˆi, i ∈ S ′,
we concentrate initially on minimax analysis. Our results then transfer easily to
LWR analysis.
2.1 Minimax analysis
It is possible, but unusual in applications, that there exists some scenario k ∈ S
such that
fi(x
∗
k) ≤ fk(x∗k) for all i ∈ S. (4)
It then follows immediately that x∗S = x
∗
k (and of course that x
∗
S′ = x
∗
k for any
subset S ′ of S such that k ∈ S ′). In this case we may think of the minimax
solution x∗S as being “determined” by the single scenario k in the sense that if the
functions fi associated with the remaining scenarios i 6= k are varied within the
region in which (4) continues to hold, then we still have x∗S = x
∗
k.
We now assume that |S| ≥ 2, i.e. that there are at least two scenarios. Then,
although there may be no single scenario k ∈ S such that the relation (4) holds, it
does very often remain the case that we can find two scenarios k, l ∈ S such that
fi(x
∗
kl) ≤ fkl(x∗kl) for all i ∈ S. (5)
Analogously to the earlier situation, it then follows that x∗S = x
∗
kl and we may think
of the minimax solution x∗S as being “determined” by the two scenarios k and l in
the same sense as previously, i.e. if the functions fi associated with the remaining
scenarios i 6= k, i 6= l, are varied within the region in which (5) continues to hold,
then still we have x∗S = x
∗
kl.
Note that if the relation (4) does hold for some k ∈ S, then the relation (5) also
holds for that k and for any other l ∈ S (with x∗S = x∗kl = x∗k), so that the former
situation may be regarded as a special case of the latter.
Figure 1 illustrates the typical situation in which the relation (5) holds: the decision
set D is taken to be the entire real line and the cost functions fi corresponding
to five scenarios i ∈ S are plotted; it is seen that (5) holds with k and l given
(uniquely) by the two scenarios whose cost functions are shown as solid lines, with
the remaining cost functions being shown as dashed lines. As above, we then have
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that the minimax solution x∗S = x
∗
kl is “determined” by the two scenarios k and l in
the sense discussed above.
kl
¤x
)x(lf)x(kf
x
Figure 1: Illustrative cost functions for a set of five scenarios: the relation (5) holds
for the two scenarios k and l whose cost functions are shown as solid lines.
We now specialise to the case where the decision D is some interval [xa, xb] of the
real line, where we may have xa = −∞ and/or xb = ∞, and where (as in the
example of Figure 1) the functions fi, i ∈ S, are convex. These conditions are
usually satisfied in practice. For simplicity we further assume that the functions fi
are strictly convex, so that in particular all minima below will be uniquely defined;
we subsequently remark how the assumption of strict convexity may be relaxed. We
then have the following result.
Proposition 1. Assume that the decision set D is given by some interval [xa, xb]
of the real line and that the functions fi are strictly convex. Then there always exist
two scenarios k, l ∈ S such that the relation (5) holds. In particular we then have,
as above, that the minimax solution x∗S associated with the set S is equal to the
minimax solution x∗kl defined by the scenarios k and l (and indeed x
∗
S′ = x
∗
kl for any
subset S ′ of S which contains both k and l).
Proof. Suppose first that xa and xb are finite and that the functions fi are further
differentiable. Clearly, there exists some k ∈ S such that fk(x∗S) = fS(x∗S). Note
that this implies that
fi(x
∗
S) ≤ fk(x∗S) for all i ∈ S. (6)
Now observe that if f ′k(x
∗
S) ≥ 0 then, by convexity, fk(x) > fk(x∗S) for all x ∈ (x∗S , xb]
and hence x∗k ≤ x∗S . Similarly if f ′k(x∗S) ≤ 0 then fk(x) > fk(x∗S) for all x ∈ [xa, x∗S)
and hence x∗k ≥ x∗S . It follows that if f ′k(x∗S) ≥ 0 and x∗S = xa, or if f ′k(x∗S) ≤ 0 and
x∗S = xb, or if f
′
k(x
∗
S) = 0, then x
∗
k = x
∗
S ; if this is so, then it further follows from (6)
that the relation (4) holds and so, as already noted, the relation (5) holds for k and
any l 6= k.
Otherwise, it is the case that either f ′k(x
∗
S) > 0 and x
∗
S > xa or else f
′
k(x
∗
S) < 0 and
x∗S < xb. Without loss of generality, we suppose the first of these two possibilities
to be the case. It follows from these conditions and from (6) that there necessarily
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exists some l 6= k such that fl(x∗S) = fk(x∗S) and f ′l (x∗S) ≤ 0 (for otherwise there
would exist some x′ ∈ [xa, x∗S) such that fS(x′) < fk(x∗S) = fS(x∗S), in contradiction
to the definition of x∗S). Then, from convexity as above,
fl(x) > fl(x
∗
S) for all x ∈ [xa, x∗S). (7)
Since also (once more by convexity)
fk(x) > fk(x
∗
S) = fl(x
∗
S) for all x ∈ (x∗S , xb], (8)
it follows from (7) and (8) that x∗kl = x
∗
S . Thus (using also (6)) the relation (5)
holds.
Once the above argument is understood, only obvious modifications are required
to deal with the case where we may have xa = −∞ or xb = ∞—e.g. we may
compactify D by the addition of these points as necessary and extend the definitions
of the convex functions fi and their derivatives by taking limits. Similarly only
obvious modifications are required to deal with the case where some or all of the
convex functions fi, i ∈ S, fail to be differentiable: any derivative such as f ′i(x) may
be replaced by the slope of a supporting hyperplane to fi at x; all that is further
required is some extra care in dealing with the nonuniqueness of these supporting
hyperplanes. Alternatively nondifferentiable convex functions may be represented as
pointwise limits of differentiable convex functions, and standard limiting arguments
used.
Remark 1. Under the relaxation of the requirement that the convexity of the func-
tions fi, i ∈ S, be strict, Proposition 1 continues to hold provided that, in the
relation (5), x∗kl is understood to refer to some value of the (no longer necessarily
uniquely defined) minimum of the function fkl.
2.2 LWR analysis
As previously remarked, the LWR solution xˆS′ associated with any subset S ′ of S is
just the minimax solution applied to the regret functions fˆi, i ∈ S ′, rather than to
the original cost functions fi, i ∈ S ′. Therefore the analysis of Section 2.1 is equally
applicable to LWR decision making.
Thus in the case where we can find two scenarios k, l ∈ S such that
fˆi(xˆkl) ≤ fˆkl(xˆkl) for all i ∈ S, (9)
it follows that xˆS = xˆkl and we may think of the LWR solution xˆS as being “deter-
mined” by the two scenarios k and l in the same sense as previously: that is, if the
functions fi associated with the remaining scenarios i 6= k, i 6= l, are varied within
the region in which (9) continues to hold, then still we have xˆS = xˆkl.
We further have that Proposition 1 for minimax analysis translates immediately to
the following equivalent result for LWR analysis.
Proposition 2. Assume that the decision set D is given by some interval [xa, xb]
of the real line and that the functions fi are strictly convex. Then there always exist
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two scenarios k, l ∈ S such that the relation (9) holds. In particular we then have
that the LWR solution xˆS associated with the set S is equal to the LWR solution xˆkl
defined by the scenarios k and l (and indeed xˆS′ = xˆkl for any subset S ′ of S which
contains both k and l).
The requirement that the convexity be strict may be relaxed in the same sense as
previously. Figure 1 continues to illustrate the situation, if the plotted functions are
now regarded as the regret functions fˆi rather than the original cost functions fi.
2.3 Argument shifts.
We continue to concentrate on LWR analysis, and we assume, for simplicity, that
the decision set D is the entire real line. Suppose that the functions fi—or equiva-
lently the functions fˆi—are convex and are ordered by their individual minimising
values xˆi = x
∗
i so that xˆ1 ≤ · · · ≤ xˆn. It is then frequently the case that the two
“extreme” scenarios 1 and n play the role of the scenarios k and l such that the
relation (9) holds, so that in particular the LWR solution is given by xˆS = xˆ1n and
that yet again this solution is “determined” by the scenarios 1 and n in the sense
described earlier.
An important special case in which the above is true occurs when (at least to a
sufficiently good approximation) the functions fi are further such that the regret
functions fˆi differ simply by argument shifts, i.e. there exist some convex function g
and constants a1 < a2 < · · · < an, such that
fˆi(x) = g(x− ai), i ∈ S, (10)
(implying in particular that xˆi = xˆ+ai for all i, where xˆ minimises g(x)). In this case
we note further that the value of xˆ1n in relation to xˆ1 and xˆn of depends on shape of
the functions fˆ1 and fˆn on either side of their individual minimising values xˆ1 and xˆn.
In particular, if additionally the functions fˆi are symmetric about their individual
minimising values xˆi then xˆS = xˆ1n = (xˆ1 + xˆn)/2. Notably this symmetry obtains
to a sufficiently good approximation when xˆ1 and xˆn are sufficiently close (an−a1 is
sufficiently small) that these fˆ1 and fˆn may be approximated in the interval [xˆ1, xˆn]
by quadratics with necessarily the same second derivative.
2.4 Alternative probabilistic analysis
An alternative, essentially Bayesian, analysis may be given by assigning a probabil-
ity pi ≥ 0 to each possible scenario i (where
∑
i∈S pi = 1) and then, for example,
determining that value xbayes of x in the decision set D which minimises the expected
cost function
f(x) =
∑
i∈S
pifi(x), (11)
or, equivalently, the expected regret function
∑
i∈S pifˆi(x).
While decision makers may choose to use LWR analysis so as to avoid assigning
explicit probabilities, it is nevertheless of interest to understand which sets of prob-
abilities within a Bayesian analysis as above are compatible with the results of an
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LWR analysis. The set of possible probability measures which may be defined on
the n scenarios forms a subset of (n − 1)-dimensional Euclidean space, and the re-
quirement the value xbayes of x which minimises f(x) as given by (11) should be
equal to the LWR xˆS typically restricts this set of probability measures to a subset
of an (n− 2)-dimensional space. We consider the matter further in Section 3.
3 Investment to reduce risk
In many applications the decision to be made is that of choosing a level of provision x,
for example for a given industrial infrastructure, needed to balance associated risk.
The cost of the provision increases linearly in x, while the cost associated with the
risk decays, typically close to exponentially, in x.
The example we have in mind particularly is that of electricity capacity procurement,
i.e. the determination of the level of generation capacity which countries (or groups
of countries) must make in order to ensure adequacy of future electricity supplies.
The distribution over time of the balance of supply over demand for the future
period under study (usually a given year or the peak season of a year) is modelled
by a probability distribution whose left tail—that corresponding to the region in
which supply is insufficient to meet demand—is typically well approximated by an
exponential function; this distribution is shifted according to the level of capacity
provision x so that both the expected total duration of shortfall (the loss of load
expectation) and the expected volume of shortfall (the expected energy unserved) for
the future period under study decay approximately exponentially in x. Investment
decisions must typically be made some years in advance and the future risk associated
with any given level of capacity provision depends on which of a number of “future
energy scenarios” eventually proves to be most appropriate to the period in question.
The likelihoods of these scenarios are typically difficult to quantify probabilistically,
and so LWR analysis is often used to determine the recommended level of investment.
Thus, we have a set of scenarios S and, for any scenario i in S and level of capacity
provision x, the expected cost of, for example, a supply-demand imbalance is (at
least approximately) of the form aie
−λix. If, further, the cost of a level of investment
is proportional to x, then the total cost function fi associated with each scenario i
is given by
fi(x) = bie
−λix + cx, (12)
for some constants λi > 0, bi > 0, and c > 0, where the latter typically does not
depend on i. For simplicity we again assume the functions fi to be defined on the
decision set consisting of the entire real line—the adjustments required if the decision
set is restricted to some interval of the real line are straightforward. The solution xˆS
of an LWR analysis is thus readily calculated. (As already observed this will remain
the same under adjustment of any of the functions fi by the addition or subtraction
of an arbitrary constant.) Since the functions fi are strictly convex, it follows as in
Section 2.2 that there always exist two “extreme” scenarios which “determine” the
LWR solution xˆS in the sense discussed there. In any given situation this pair is
readily numerically identifiable, but our interest here is to provide some insight as
to what it is which really drives the results of any LWR analysis.
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We specialise to the case where the exponential decay constants λi are given by the
same constant λ for all i ∈ S. That this is frequently a good approximation in the
case of the electricity capacity procurement example above follows from the fact
that differences between scenarios are often well represented simply by argument
shifts in the distribution of the supply-demand balance, coupled with the fact that,
as already remarked, the left tail of this distribution is typically exponential—again
at least to a good approximation; it then follows that differences between scenarios
typically correspond simply to differences in the constants bi in (12). Further, even
when this approximation is less than perfect, the broad conclusions of the analysis
below are likely to continue to apply. A similar situation occurs in many other areas
of application.
Thus the cost functions fi are as given by (12) with λi = λ for all scenarios i, and
we assume that these scenarios are ordered so that b1 < · · · < bn. Each function fi
is then minimised at
xˆi =
1
λ
log
biλ
c
(13)
and we have xˆ1 < · · · < xˆn. The regret functions fˆi are given by
fˆi(x) = bie
−λx + cx− c
λ
(
1 + log
biλ
c
)
(14)
for all x as usual, and it is easily seen that these satisfy the relation (10) with the
function g given by
g(x) = e−λx + cx− c
λ
(
1 + log
λ
c
)
and ai = (log bi)/λ for each i ∈ S. It follows from the discussion of Section 2.3 that
the scenarios 1 and n are “extreme” in the sense that the relation (9) holds with
k = 1 and l = n, so that once more the LWR solution is given by xˆS = xˆ1n and this
solution is determined by the “extreme” scenarios 1 and n in the sense described in
Section 2. Further the quantity xˆ1n is the unique solution x = xˆ1n of the equation
fˆ1(x) = fˆn(x). Thus an entirely routine calculation gives that the LWR solution xˆS
is given by
xˆS = xˆ1n =
1
λ
log
λ(bn − b1)
c(log bn − log b1) , (15)
irrespective of the values of b2, . . . , bn−1, provided only that the inequalities b1 <
· · · < bn continue to be satisfied.
Note also that when the extreme scenarios 1 and n are close to each other, i.e. b1
and bn are close so that we may write bn = b1(1 + d) for some small d > 0, then
again straightforward calculations give the approximations
xˆn ≈ xˆ1 + d
λ
, (16)
xˆ1n ≈ xˆ1 + d
2λ
, (17)
where in each case the error in the approximation is of the order of d2 as d → 0.
Thus, when xˆ1 and xˆn are close, then xˆ1n is, to a very good approximation, the
mean of xˆ1 and xˆn. However, in many applications d as defined above is not small,
and it is easy to check that it is then the case that xˆ1n is closer to xˆn than to xˆ1.
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We now look at the alternative probabilistic, Bayesian, analysis considered in Sec-
tion 2.4, in which a probability pi ≥ 0 (such that
∑
i∈S pi = 1) is assigned to each
possible scenario i ∈ S. When the cost functions fi are as given by (12), then the
value xbayes of x which minimises the (strictly convex) expected cost function (11)
is the unique solution x = xbayes of∑
i∈S
pibiλie
−λix = c. (18)
In particular when λi = λ for all i, we have
xbayes =
1
λ
log
λ
∑
i∈S pibi
c
, (19)
and it then follows from (15) and (19) that we have xˆS = xˆ1n = xbayes if and only if∑
i∈S
pibi = b¯, (20)
where the quantity b¯ is given by
b¯ =
bn − b1
log bn − log b1 . (21)
The equations (20) and (21) therefore determines those sets of probabilities pi which,
if used in a probabilistic analysis, yield the same decision as that given by the LWR
analysis. Note that it is straightforward to show that b1 < b¯ < bn—and indeed
that b¯ is approximately the mean of b1 and bn when these two quantities are close
to each other. The equation (20) has the interpretation that, in the case where
λi = λ for all i, the LWR analysis and the probabilistic analysis yield the same
solutions (values of the decision variable x) if and only if the probabilities pi are
such that the corresponding expectation of the scenario parameters bi is equal to
the “parameter” b¯.
4 Example: electricity capacity procurement in Great
Britain
National Grid—the electricity system operator in Great Britain—has a statutory
responsibility to produce an annual report to Government recommending a level of
GB generation capacity procurement in order to provide adequate security of future
electricity supplies. Its 2015 Electricity Capacity Report (ECR) [6] is concerned to
recommend a level of procurement for the “year”, i.e. the winter, of 2019–20 (winter
being the GB peak season of electricity demand). The report considers a set S of
19 possible future scenarios and “sensitivities” (we shall sometimes simply refer to
all of these as scenarios) for the above future period. Associated with each such
scenario i in S is an (annual) cost function fi given by
fi(x) = VOLL× EEUi(x) + CONE× x, (22)
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where x is a possible value of generation capacity to procure—typically measured
in MW—which might be considered for recommendation and EEUi(x) is the corre-
sponding expected energy unserved, as defined in Section 3 and usually measured in
MWh, over the future period studied; the constants VOLL and CONE are respec-
tively the value of lost load and the so-called cost of new entry, i.e. the unit cost per
year of generation capacity which might be procured. The report uses values of these
constants given by VOLL = £17, 000/MWh and CONE = £49, 000/MW/year.
The functions EEUi(x) decay approximately exponentially in x, so that the cost
functions fi are strictly convex and approximately of the form (12); further the
exponential constants λi in (12) are approximately equal over all scenarios i ∈ S;
however, while the exponential approximation is useful for exploring many issues,
we do not make any formal use of it in the analysis below.
The choice of recommended capacity to procure x is made on the basis of LWR
analysis. The decision set D of allowed values of x to be considered is not quite
continuous, as National Grid also have a requirement, for the purposes of further
analysis, to associate a particular scenario (or sensitivity) with the value of x finally
recommended. The decision set D is thus restricted to a set of 19 values xi, i ∈
S, such that each xi is just sufficient for scenario i to meet a specified reliability
standard. This reliability standard is fairly closely aligned with the values of the
constants VOLL and CONE so that each value xi in the decision set approximately
minimises the function fi(x) given by (22).
1 However, for the present analysis we
treat the decision set D as continuous and formally consisting of all possible values of
x. It turns out that if we do this, and determine the resulting solution xˆS of the LWR
analysis, the set of allowed valued considered in the 2015 ECR is sufficiently dense
in the neighbourhood of xˆS that we can find one such value very close to xˆS . Hence
the assumption of the present analysis to treat the decision set D as continuous
makes very little difference in practice (see also the results below).
Figure 2 relates to the five major scenarios considered by the 2015 ECR, together
with two of the remaining 14 variant scenarios or “sensitivities” also considered. Four
of these five major scenarios were developed by National Grid and are discussed in
detail in the above report. The fifth is a reference scenario developed by the UK
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). (Because of a requirement
that the recommendations of the report be independent of Government, this latter
scenario is ultimately excluded from the analysis of the report, something which—as
we point out below—makes no difference to the result of the LWR analysis.) For
each of the scenarios i illustrated, Figure 2 plots the total cost fi(x) given by (22)
against the corresponding capacity to procure x, where here x is given in gigawatts.
The curves corresponding to the five major scenarios are shown as solid lines, while
1The reliability standard requires that each xi should be such that the associated loss of load
expectation (LOLE)—again as defined in Section 3—does not exceed 3 hours per year. Under the
exponential approximation (12), each cost function fi is minimised by that value of x such that the
corresponding LOLE is given by the ratio CONE/VOLL, which is 2.88 hours per year—see [7] for
the associated analysis. This latter figure is sufficiently close to the LOLE defining the reliability
standard that, in the case of any single scenario i ∈ S, the requirement of choosing x to meet the
reliability standard does not significantly conflict with the economic criterion of choosing x so as to
minimise the cost function fi(x).
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those corresponding to the two variant “sensitivities” are shown as dashed lines; the
names attached to the scenarios are those of the 2015 ECR. This figure is essentially a
reproduction of Figure 14 of the 2015 ECR; the latter figure plots the same seven cost
functions. Note that these cost functions are all convex, as are those corresponding
to the remaining 12 “sensitivities” not illustrated. The latter cost functions are all
pointwise intermediate between those for the two “sensitivities” which have been
plotted, and are omitted both from the present figure and from Figure 14 of the
2015 ECR so as to avoid undue clutter (see also below).
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Figure 2: Combined cost of energy unserved and procured capacity, i.e. the cost
functions fi(x), against capacity to procure x for each of the five major scenarios
and two variant “sensitivities” illustrated in Figure 14 of the 2015 ECR.
Figure 3 plots the regret functions fˆi(x) against capacity to procure x for the same
seven scenarios illustrated in Figure 2. It is now seen that the two scenarios consid-
ered as “sensitivities”, plotted as dashed lines, and labelled Slow Progression Low
Demand and Consumer Power Cold, are such that the relation (5) is satisfied with
k and l indexing these two scenarios, and where the set S is here taken to be the set
of seven scenarios illustrated. That this is so is unsurprising insofar as the seven re-
gret functions fˆi, i ∈ S, illustrated are clearly—to a good approximation—related to
each other by argument shifts, as described in Section 2.3, and the two “sensitivities”
identified above are clearly extreme in the sense discussed there.
We thus have xˆS = xˆkl = 47.8 GW—this value corresponding to the point of inter-
section of the regret functions for the above two “sensitivities”. All this continues to
be the case when the set S is taken to consist of all 19 scenarios considered by the
2015 ECR; that the relation (5) then continues to hold with k and l indexing the
same two “sensitivities” identified above (i.e. Slow Progression Low Demand and
Consumer Power Cold) would be immediately apparent if, for example, all the 19
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Figure 3: Regret functions fˆi(x), against capacity to procure x for each of the five
major scenarios and two variant “sensitivities” illustrated in Figure 14 of the 2015
ECR.
regret functions fˆi, i ∈ S, were similarly plotted. Thus, for these 19 scenarios, the
LWR capacity to procure is 47.8 GW. Because the analysis of the 2015 ECR restricts
the decision set D as described earlier, the capacity to procure recommended by that
report is 47.9 GW. This is the capacity to procure which precisely meets the relia-
bility standard for one of the other (more minor) “sensitivities” considered in the
report. However, a difference of 0.1 GW is quite negligible in relation the possible
impact of many of the other uncertainties involved, for example the true values of all
the data underlying the analysis, or the values of the parameters VOLL and CONE.
The lesson to be learned from the above analysis is that it is the two “extreme”
scenarios or “sensitivities”, as identified above, which largely determine the LWR
solution xˆS . This solution is indifferent to the remaining scenarios so long as they
do not themselves become more extreme than either of the above two. However,
the “extreme” scenarios are often, as here, relatively minor ones. Considerable care
nevertheless needs to be taken in their definition, precisely because it is they that
are critical in determining the result of the analysis.
Alternative probabilistic analysis. In line with the alternative, Bayesian, ap-
proach outlined in Section 2.4, we consider briefly what assignment of probabilities
to scenarios would, on minimisation of the expression given by (11) so as to de-
termine the solution xbayes of a Bayesian analysis, result in the same value of the
capacity to procure as that given by the solution xˆS of the LWR analysis. Since
the cost functions fi may here reasonably be treated as differentiable, in addition to
being convex, it follows from (11) that the sets of such probabilities pi, i ∈ S, are
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given by the solution of ∑
i∈S
pif
′
i(xˆS) = 0. (23)
If the set S is taken to consist of all 19 scenarios of the 2015 ECR, then the sets of
probabilities such that (23) holds form a 17-dimensional region. If we restrict atten-
tion to the two “extreme” sensitivities Slow Progression Low Demand and Consumer
Power Cold which determine the LWR solution xˆS in the sense we have discussed
in this paper, then some numerical experimentation shows that the assignment of
a probability 0.68 to the first of these and 0.32 to the second (with a probability 0
assigned to all the remaining scenarios) gives xbayes = xˆS = 47.8 GW as required.
That these probabilities are approximately correct may also be seen (using (23))
from Figure 3.
A uniform assignment of probabilities 0.2 to each of the five major scenarios consid-
ered by the 2015 ECR, and whose cost and regret functions are plotted in Figures 2
and 3, results in a capacity to procure of xbayes = 47.7 GW. The exclusion of the
DECC scenario (which, as previously explained, was not included in the final anal-
ysis of the report) increases this to xbayes = 48.0 GW. A uniform assignment of
probabilities to all 19 scenarios and “sensitivities” considered in the report again re-
sults in a value xbayes = 48.0 GW (and 48.1 GW if the DECC scenario is excluded).
As it happens, none of these figures is here significantly different from the result
of the LWR analysis. The latter is therefore reasonably robust, in this particular
case, across a range of plausible assignments of probabilities to scenarios. That this
is so is essentially a combination of the fact that the regret functions are close to
being obtained from each other by simple shifts of their arguments as described in
Section 2.3 and of the fact that the scenarios are relatively evenly spaced between
their extremes.
5 Conclusion
Minimax and LWR analysis are commonly used for decision making whenever it is
difficult, or perhaps inappropriate, to attach probabilities to possible future scenar-
ios. We have shown that, for each of these two approaches and subject only to the
convexity of the cost functions involved, it is always the case that there exist two
“extreme” scenarios whose costs determine the outcome of the analysis in the sense
we have made precise in Section 2. (The “extreme” scenarios need not be the same
for each of the two approaches.) The results of either analysis are therefore particu-
larly sensitive to the cost functions associated with the corresponding two “extreme”
scenarios (while being largely unaffected by those associated with the remainder).
In effect the results are sensitive to the definitions of these two scenarios, and indeed
to whether or not they are even included in the specification of the problem. Great
care is therefore required in applications to identify these scenarios and to consider
their reasonableness.
We have also considered the common situation in which, at least to a good ap-
proximation, the regret functions differ from each other essentially by shifts of their
arguments. In this case the two “extreme” scenarios are the obvious ones, namely
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those whose regret functions have the greatest relative shift in their arguments.
It is further possible here to specify those sets of probabilities which, if assigned
to scenarios under an alternative Bayesian analysis, would produce the answers as
given by a LWR analysis in particular. At a minimum this assists in assessing the
reasonableness of scenarios for inclusion in a LWR analysis.
A particular example of the above situation may occur in the case of determining
a appropriate level of investment in order to control a risk. Here the cost func-
tions associated with possible future scenarios are often the sum of an exponentially
decaying and a linearly increasing component, and further the exponential decay
rates are often approximately the same for all scenarios. This in the case with the
problem of determining an appropriate level of electricity capacity procurement in
Great Britain, where decisions must be made several years in advance, in spite of
considerable uncertainty as to which of a number of future scenarios may occur, and
where LWR analysis is currently used as the basis of decision making. We have con-
sidered in detail the analysis of the 2015 Electricity Capacity Report submitted to
the UK Government by National Grid plc. Here the “extreme” scenarios determin-
ing the result of the LWR analysis are readily identified. Given these, the outcome
of the LWR analysis appears reasonably robust against a variety of assignments of
probabilities to the set of all the scenarios used.
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